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FOREWORD: VOICE IN GOVERNMENT
JOHN

Roos*

This issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy is devoted to the question of "Voice in Government." This
issue addresses, at the most fundamental level, a general sense
among the American people that they are not being listened to
and that their voice does not count in the halls of power. The
five lead articles present a fully interdisciplinary approach, ranging from citizen activists to political scientists to law professors.
Professor Emily Calhoun of the University of Colorado Law
School, in her article entitled "First Amendment, Petitioning and
Colorado's Amendment Two," presents an interesting and provocative look at the often overlooked "Petition Clause" of the
First Amendment. Professor Calhoun argues that the Petition
Clause, while protecting "mere" speech which may have an adversarial aim, also protects a voice, and hence a set of interests, that
are distinct from and irreducible to the speech interests in the
Speech Clause. Calhoun argues that in addition to the ends
served by adversarial speech, the Constitution points towards
another set of ends served by the Petition Clause. She characterizes these ends as transactional interests or "a voice of the people
for the common good." Calhoun makes good use of political scientist Jane Mansbridge's book, Beyond Adversary Democracy, which
argues that our democratic polity stands in need of not only
adversarial but also unitary democratic forms and practices.
After reviewing the small case law on petition cases, and the
conditions under which it has been recognized and limited, Calhoun presents an extended analysis of Colorado's current
Amendment 2 controversy. She argues that the ban on local
ordinances providing relief for victims of discrimination on
grounds Of homosexual orientation not only violates a speech
interest but also "affects transactional as well as speech interests."
Marty Jezer of the Working Group for Electoral Democracy
and Ellen Miller of the Center for Responsive Politics, passionately argue that representative democracy is poisoned by the
impact of private "special interest" money in elections. They
argue that private money and personal wealth dominate the electoral process. They allege that money determines who has the
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resources to run, which issues will be allowed access to the
agenda, and ultimately who will win the election.
Similarly, they argue that special interest money compromises the legislative process. The authors admit that proof is
a difficult burden in such allegations, and hence they argue that
there is a pattern of "empirical evidence, backed by statistical
data to indicate that.., public officials are beholden to those
who provided the money for their election." Using examples,
they try to show a correlation between financial backing and legislative action. They indicate that the influence will be greatest
on specialized, concrete issues at the least visible parts of the process. Citing such cases as the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America's opposition to tort reform they argue that often the
greatest impact of special interests is to prevent action such as
reform.
Arguing that the Federal Electoral Commission Acts of the
1970s have failed, they endorse a comprehensive alternative draft
bill entitled Democratically Financed Elections. Under DFE
there would be complete federal funding of primary and general
elections, accompanied by spending caps. There would also be a
ban on candidates raising and spending private money during
the election cycle. The plan, in order to avoid the free speech
problems raised by Buckley v. Valeo, would depend upon voluntary
acceptance by candidates of spending limits and private funds in
exchange for public financing. The bill would place qualification levels for primary and general eligibility for funding, and
would attempt to limit political party and third part "independent expenditures," though the details of how this could be
accomplished under Buckley are sketchy.
Gregory Schmid of the Institute for the Future presents the
most sweeping and optimistic (possibly utopian) call for
increased citizen voice in his article "Recovering Athenian
Democracy in California." Schmid, believing that ancient Athens
and modern California have a comparably educated citizenry,
argues that California's increasing reliance on direct democracy
mechanisms such as ballot initiatives is the normative wave of the
future, showing the information age how to move from representative democracy to direct democracy.
Schmid argues that Athens, as a rich, homogeneous, open
society, offered in the fourth century B.C. "the standard of pure
democracy." He does mention the limitations of Athenian direct
democracy, (though not those stated in the Politics and the Republic), but argues that this model now can be favored over representative democracy which is being undermined by new driving
forces. Schmid argues that rising educational attainment, rising
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wealth, the shift to information-related jobs, growing skepticism
about authority resulting from education, and dramatic enabling
technologies such as personal computers, cable television and
Internet, have together created the time for a. "more -direct
involvement of citizens in key decisions involving their own
governance.
Schmid argues that California growing use of direct ballot
measures provides a model. Direct ballot measures have grown
dramatically since the 1960s, and have resulted in such major
policy shifts as approval of the death penalty and the proposition
13 tax revolt in 1978. Schmid argues that California citizen's
have high levels of support for the use of such mechanisms. As a
result, they vote at high rates on them, discriminate between
competing and confusing proposals, and have effectively used
ballot measures to impose strategic guidelines on government.
Though seeing some limitations (i.e., avoidance of detail and
lack of minority protection), Schmid argues that the advantages
(people like it, openness, breaking established political habits,
symmetry with "driving" demographic and technological forces)
outweigh the limitations.
Michael Schudson from the Communications Dept. at the
University of California San Diego draws from another political
scientist, Theda Skocpol, to analyze the relationship between the
state and the public sphere. Schudson questions the way in
which the conventional account of civil society and the state is
presented. In a tradition reaching back to Hegel in Europe and
Tocqueville in America, it is often assumed that the voice of the
people is formed in the autonomous space in between state
mechanism and private society. In this analysis, civil society is the
place where voices emerge, and then the question becomes one
of whether the State responds to those voices.
Schudson argues that we must remind ourselves of the many
and varied ways in which "governmental institutions" help and
hinder the formation of the "voice" of citizens in the first place.
He does so by closely inspecting the effect of variations in governmental structure, legislative investigative functions, overlap of
spheres (i.e. broadcasting), government construction of civic
personality, the role of parties, and governments role in providing (variable) forums for citizen access. In each of these areas,
and then collectively, Schudson argues that the state, rather than
responding (or not) to an autonomous voice, is in fact responding (or not) to voice shaped in part by the state's own activities.
Schudson suggests that we have to reject the Marxist notion of
the state as superstructure, and instead think of the state as a

424

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

framework for shaping voice, which was Skocpol's original aim in
coining the phrase "bringing the state back in."
George Adler, in his article entitled, "Community
Action
and Maximum Feasible Participation," addresses the history of
the Office of Economic Opportunity attempt to increase the
voice of the powerless in the planning and implementation of
federal anti-poverty and urban redevelopment efforts. Adler
points out that the original mandate of the OEO to include the
"maximum feasible participation" of the residents of the areas
and members of the groups served by the anti-poverty programs,
was beset by several problems.
Adler points out that the OEO from the beginning was faced
with a struggle between city halls and local citizens groups over
control of scarce resources. Further more, the Act never clarified its priorities. The Act never answers the question of whether
delivery of service is primary, or is restructuring of local power
relationships primary? Adler draws upon commentators of the
period such as Alinsky, Mansbridge and Moynihan, though he
spends little time on Moynihan's analysis. Interestingly, Adler
points out that the consensual assumptions of participatory
democracy may have to be (and can be) reconciled with adversarial elements of program design.
Adler further argues that despite the shortcomings of the
OEO, there are lessons to be learned which might help us devise
a strategy to increase the voice of the poor with more success.
He introduces the concept of "participatory justice," which he
distinguishes from its new left predecessor of "participatory
democracy" by emphasizing that rather than individuals within
communities being the sole focus of empowerment, we should
recognize that subsidiary institutions like church, neighborhood,
community organizations and other similar groups can and
should be vehicles for allowing the voice of the individual poor
to be heard. Pointing to successful groups such as the hundreds
of community development corporations (CDC's) around the
country, Adler argues that while more resources are an essential
part of any urban redevelopment strategy, the employment of
local groups and organizations holds promise for actual
implementation.
As stated before, what binds these articles together, regardless of their difference on details, is their common assumption
that the problem in American democracy is responsiveness. If
government would simply listen to the will or "voice" of the people, our civic lives would be better. To question such an apparently unobjectionable goal would be unwise. And yet, as a
political scientist, it is incumbent upon me to at least mention
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other possible analyses of the problem. In addition to the voice
and responsiveness strain of analysis seen here, there is another
strain both in our democratic heritage and in political science
that needs to be mentioned. Certainly the Founders wanted
more "voice" than George III allowed. But they also had a decade of experience under the state constitutions of the Articles of
Confederation, in which legislative responsiveness was widespread. Part of the problem they faced was how to reconcile
democratic responsiveness with the common good. Put simply,
James Madison reminds us that a majority faction is still a faction
if it acts against the "permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." Madison felt that democratic opinion did not simply and automatically align itself in accord with the common
good, and both the character of representatives and virtues of
institutions were necessary to refine and enlarge public opinion.
Today some political scientists make similar points. For
example, GaryJacobson, David Mayhew and Leroy Rieselbach all
point out the tension between the virtue of "responsiveness,"
which would maximize "voice," and the virtue of governmental
"responsibility," which would emphasize the needs of the common good even if unpopular. One prime example each looks at
is the question of deficits. To the extent that government is
responsive, our "voices" tend to say we want higher services and
lower taxes. At the same time, however, our voices say that we
want fiscal responsibility. When election time comes around, we
tend to reward with re-election the representatives that listen to
our desires for high services and low taxes, rather than those who
listen to the fiscal responsibility voice.
To give another example that came up in the papers: if we
maximize direct citizen voice in government, the death penalty
will be expanded, because it is popular among high majorities of
Americans. My point is not to oppose mechanisms that increase
citizen voice. All five articles rightly point out the frustration and
the alienation that citizens feel about their ability to influence
their government. But in increasing this voice, we must be aware
that certain issues will not be resolved by "voice." We must simultaneously pay attention to theories of representation which allow
us to grapple with issues like spending, taxing and minority
rights where voice must be reconciled with the demands of the
common good.

